Download Aerospace Operations Against Elusive Ground Targets by Alan Vick PDF

By Alan Vick

Identifies suggestions and applied sciences which could increase the us Air Force's potential to notice, classify, realize, and defeat elusive ambitions, even if dispersed floor forces or cellular ballistic missles.

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Sample text

S. air forces. The Kosovo Experience 19 Flight, Bosnian Serb air defenders passed offboard data to their SA-6 systems in attempts to trap NATO aircraft. S. F-16 aircraft flying a routine sortie to enforce the nofly zone. During Operation Deliberate Force, Serb air defenders escaped destruction from anti-radiation missiles by blinking their radars and engaging with minimal radar guidance, a technique the VJ used again during Operation Allied Force. Evading Attack by Air Power Before Operation Allied Force even began, the VJ was already dispersed to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the KLA.

Air Force, 2000c p. 19. S. Air Force, 2000c, p. 33. 26 Aerospace Operations Against Elusive Ground Targets NATO’s cohesion and to propitiate congressional opinion,25 the Clinton administration announced publicly that opposed land operations were not under consideration. As a result, NATO started Operation Allied Force with only 214 combat aircraft and just 50 approved targets. The United States had only 112 land-based combat aircraft available and no aircraft carrier within range. When Belgrade refused to capitulate, the United States went to the opposite extreme and began a large-scale deployment (Papa Bear) that would have been in excess of need.

Humanitarian concerns precipitated this operation, but they remained a relatively weak casus belli. NATO leaders, initially unwilling to contemplate stronger action, tended to believe that Belgrade would capitulate after a few days. Yugoslav leaders decided to expel ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, apparently unaware that this act would unite the NATO allies and make them determined to prevail. ”1 The result of these miscalculations was a protracted air effort that neither side wanted nor expected.

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