By Terence Wise
Images and textual content on armor camouflage and markings of the USA, British and German armies, June 1944 to may well 1945. Contents are: the foundations of Camouflage, the USA military (national id and aerial acceptance marks, unit codes, registration numbers), The British military (national identificaiton and aerial recornition marks, unit identity symbols, unit serial numbers, tactical indicators, registration numbers) and the German military (national markings, unit symptoms, arm of carrier symbols, and tactical marks). numerous pictures, or illustrations on each one web page.
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Extra info for D-Day to Berlin: Armor Camouflage and Markings of the United States, British and German Armies, June 1944 to May 1945 - Specials series (6026
V. Jones is a concise, clear specification of the ways to hide something real (dissimulation) and the corresponding ways to show something false (simulation) in its place. The Principles of Security I hope that, without being historically comprehensive, the examples that I have given above will illustrate the principles of deception as far as I know them. As a first step, what has to be done is to prevent the enemy from deducing at least one of the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Where you are, and/or where he is.
8. Where you are, and/or where he is. What weapons and forces you have at your disposal. What you intend to do. Where you intend to do it. When you intend to do it. How you intend to do it. Your knowledge of the enemy’s intentions and techniques. How successful the enemy’s operations are. All these objectives are in a sense negative, but they may be sufficient to achieve surprise. Basically they involve security rather than deception. Wolfe, for example, surprised Montcalm at Quebec because Montcalm had not thought that the Heights of Abraham could be scaled;2 and the introduction of centimetric radar helped to change the balance in the battle of the Atlantic because the Germans were unaware that we had developed this new technique.
4-40. 39 Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore 7. 8. 9. 10. 40 cycle folks continually contend with “our threat,” while friendly commanders employ it at the time and place of their choosing. Sequencing Rule: Deception activities should be sequenced to maximize the portrayal of the deception story for as long as possible. Unit activities indicating the true mission should be masked (operational security, or OPSEC) to the last possible instant. Importance of Feedback: An intelligence collection scheme should be employed to determine if the deception is being adopted, rejected, or deceptively countered.