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By Richard S. Markovits

Volume 2 makes use of the industrial and criminal concepts/theories of quantity 1 to (1) learn the U.S. and E.U. antitrust legality of mergers, joint ventures, and the pricing-technique and contractual/sales-policy distributor-control surrogates for vertical integration and (2) determine similar positions of students and U.S. and E.U. antitrust officers. Its research of horizontal mergers (1) delineates non-market-oriented protocols for selecting whether or not they appear particular anticompetitive motive, might decrease pageant, or are rendered lawful through the efficiencies they might generate, (2) criticizes the U.S. courts’ conventional market-share/market-concentration protocol, the HHI-oriented protocols of the 1992 U.S. DOJ/FTC directions and the ecu fee (EC) guidance, and many of the non-market-oriented protocols the DOJ/FTC have more and more been utilizing, (3) argues that, even supposing the 2010 U.S. directions and DOJ/FTC officers talk about industry definition as though it issues, these directions really reject market-oriented methods, and (4) reports the proper U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its research of conglomerate mergers (1) indicates that they could practice a similar valid and competition-increasing capabilities as horizontal mergers and will yield illegitimate gains and decrease festival via expanding contrived oligopolistic pricing and retaliation boundaries to funding, (2) analyzes the determinants of these kinds of results, and (3) assesses limit-price conception, the toe-hold-merger doctrine, and U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its research of vertical behavior (1) examines the valid features of every form of such behavior, (2) delineates the stipulations lower than which each and every manifests particular anticompetitive motive and/or lessens festival, and (3) assesses comparable U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC positions. Its research of joint ventures (1) explains that they violate U.S. legislation purely after they happen particular anticompetitive rationale whereas they violate E.U. legislations both therefore or simply because they decrease pageant, (2) discusses the which means of an “ancillary restraint” and demonstrates that even if a joint-venture contract will be unlawful if it imposed no restraints and even if any restraints imposed are ancillary should be made up our minds in basic terms via case-by-case research, (3) explains why students and officers overestimate the industrial potency of R&D joint ventures, and (4) discusses comparable U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC positions. The study’s end (1) stories how its analyses justify its leading edge conceptual structures and (2) compares U.S. and E.U. antitrust legislations as written and as applied.

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Extra resources for Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law: Volume II Economics-Based Legal Analyses of Mergers, Vertical Practices, and Joint Ventures

Example text

I will first explain the various reasons why a horizontal merger that generates no dynamic efficiencies may deter the merged firm from making a QV investment that would increase the ARDEPPS’ equilibrium QV-investment level, then explain why such a merger may deter an actual or potential rival of the merged firm from making a QV investment that would increase the ARDEPPS’ equilibrium QV-investment level, and finally explain why, perversely, in a few situations such a merger may induce the merged firm or one of its actual rivals to make a QV investment that would increase the relevant ARDEPPS’ equilibrium QV-investment level.

I will focus first on the ways in which such a merger will affect the merged firm’s practice of contrived oligopolistic pricing and then on the ways in which it will affect the merged firm’s Rs’ practice of contrived oligopolistic pricing. So far as the merged firm is concerned, such a merger will (1) decrease the OMs it attempts to contrive (relative to the OMs the MPs would have attempted to contrive) by increasing the amount of safe profits it must put at risk to do so (by increasing the merged firm’s [HNOP þ NOM À MC] figure), (2) increase the OMs it attempts to contrive by creating a larger firm that can take advantage of company-wide economies of scale in building and maintaining a reputation for contrivance, 2.

Will equal (rather than be lower than) the R’s marginal cost (since, post-merger, the R is second-placed). , by naturally deterring Rs that would have prevented an MP from obtaining an NOM from undercutting the merged firm’s NOM-containing price) is directly related to (1) the amount by which the merger increased the merged firm’s OCAs above the best-placed MP’s (MPs’) OCAs and the merger increases the R’s prices to its own customers, which it may do in three ways. , by making the merged firm’s relevant-matching-offer price more discriminatory than its antecedents’ relevant-matching-offer prices would have been.

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