Download Lectures on Regulatory & Competition Policy (Occasional by Irwin M. Stelzer PDF

By Irwin M. Stelzer

For a few years, Dr Irwin Stelzer, the commercial commentator and journalist, has been stimulating audiences around the globe with lectures on more than a few financial themes. during this quantity, the IEA reprints revised models of twelve lectures in 3 components the place Dr Stelzer is said as knowledgeable - festival coverage and the shape it may take; the right kind position of law in aggressive and monopolised markets; and the content material of power and environmental rules. The essays include many optimistic proposals for extending the succeed in of aggressive markets they usually comprehensively refute a few significant monetary fallacies. it is a stimulating selection of rules from one of many most appropriate monetary commentators of the day.

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Lectures on Regulatory & Competition Policy (Occasional Paper, 120)

For a few years, Dr Irwin Stelzer, the industrial commentator and journalist, has been stimulating audiences around the globe with lectures on a number of financial issues. during this quantity, the IEA reprints revised types of twelve lectures in 3 components the place Dr Stelzer is said as a professional - festival coverage and the shape it's going to take; the right kind position of rules in aggressive and monopolised markets; and the content material of strength and environmental rules.

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Extra resources for Lectures on Regulatory & Competition Policy (Occasional Paper, 120)

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Those who feel that predation is a non-problem err for another reason: even if we assume, with the Chicago School, that 55 Neale and Goyder, op. cit. 45 l e c t u r e s o n r e g u l at o ry a n d c o m p e t i t i o n p o l i c y preservation of efficient competition is the sole goal of antitrust policy, predation can be a threat to the achievement of that goal. This is so for several reasons: 1. Predation is said to be irrational because, in the end, most markets are contestable. Drive out a competitor with below-cost (somehow measured) price cuts, or costly advertising, or some other tactic, and a swarm of new entrants will appear before the forgone profits can be recouped.

Third, we must know where the arena is, its geographic dimension: is the fight between domestic companies only, or are foreigners effective contestants for the consumer’s favour? Finally, all of these analyses must have a time dimension: substantial short-term monopoly power may melt away in the face of changes in the product and geographic dimensions of a market resulting from adaptations by existing firms; entry; or changes in technology, government regulation, or consumer tastes and preferences.

The wide acceptance accorded to antitrust policy in the United States – described as ‘so astonishing’ to outsiders39 – is due to the fact that ‘Antitrust has a broader base than the findings of economists as to the conditions required 36 Ibid, p. 18. 37 Ibid, p. 206. 38 Critics of treble-damage actions are often sceptical of the claims of injury by individual competitors who may well have lost out to a more efficient rival. Such scepticism is quite proper – and should be applied as well to claims by the victor that his sole intent was the honourable one of long-run profit maximisation, and his competitive weapon greater efficiency.

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