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Additional resources for Transitional Economies: Banking, Finance, Institutions
McMillan and B. Naughton, `How to Reform a Planned Economy', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 8 (1992), 103±43. P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, `Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complements', Econometrica, 58 (1990), 1255±77 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: CUP, 1990). A. Rapaczynski, `The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (1996), 87±103. G. Roland, `The Role of Political Constraints in Transition Strategies', Economics of Transition, 2 (1994), 27±41.
Second, it may not be possible to agree the terms of transaction for each contingency. Third, it may not be possible credibly to enforce all the terms of a contract. Hence economic contracts are inevitably incomplete in the sense that they do not cover many of the contingencies. Incentive alignment, in this case, requires appropriate ex post distribution of bargaining power (Grossman and Hart, 1986). This is effected, to a large extent, by the legal system. The role of the legal system Transactions in a market-based economy can be broadly divided into two types: (a) arm's-length trades that do not involve the buyer and seller in any interrelated activity; and (b) other transactions in which there is some degree of joint `production' or interaction between the trading parties.
In stylized analyses, `price discovery' (realization by the 26 Transitional Economies markets of a price best approximating the security's net present value) occurs through the efforts of private investors. Investors gather pricesensitive information to profit from it; and the pattern of their trades `conveys' the information to the market (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). But for this mechanism to work, investors must be willing to trade on the market or, alternatively, have `confidence' in the marketplace.